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Abstract 
 
Sustaining innovation in the face of pressures to be cost-competitive and make effective use of existing 
resources is not a new challenge, but recent acceleration of competition has pushed this issue high on the 
agenda for managers and researchers. Organizing and managing the “ambidextrous” company – a firm 
that excel in exploring new areas of productive knowledge and exploiting existing capabilities – has 
emerged as a major concern of strategic management.  In this paper, we explore coordination problems 
that make it difficult for firms to realize their potential as ambidextrous competitors. Organizations may 
possess superior skills for both exploration and exploitation yet fail to achieve competitive capabilities.  
Ambidexterity often involves high levels of differentiation within organizations and creates critical 
challenges for coordination.   
 
Keywords: Exploration, Exploitation, coordination and inter-unit differentiation  
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Sustaining aggressive innovation in the face of pressures to be cost-competitive and make highly 
effective use of existing resources is not a new challenge for business (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Leonard-Barton, 1992).  However, the acceleration of competition during 
the last decade has pushed this issue high on the agenda for managers and business researchers. 
Organizing and managing the “ambidextrous” company – a firm that can excel in both exploring new 
areas of productive knowledge and exploiting existing capabilities – has emerged as a major concern of 
strategic management (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; He and Wong, 2004). 
Companies in emerging and transitional economies often have been viewed as immune to these 
pressures; they are seen as low-cost competitors or firms that survive on the strength of local ties and 
channels.  However, many companies in China now are facing the same challenges as their counterparts in 
the West.  Rapid technological and market change have combined with the opening of borders to create 
new pressures for innovation, especially as Chinese companies move into more sophisticated and higher 
value-added areas of industry.   At the same time, shortages of skilled labor and rising labor costs have 
begun to erode the advantages Chinese companies have enjoyed over their competitors in other parts of 
Asia and the world.  The result has been a growing need for Chinese companies to master the art of 
ambidextrous competition – to learn to explore new areas of product and technical knowledge while 
intensifying the exploitation of existing capabilities. 
This ambidexterity involves organizational complexity that can be difficult to manage, regardless 
of where a firm is situated (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).   Exploration and exploitation require different 
skills and flourish under different structures and incentives.  This type of unit-level specialization leads to 
differentiation within firms that can create problems for coordination and breed unproductive conflict 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). 
In this paper, we explore some fundamental coordination problems that can make it difficult for 
firms to realize their potential as ambidextrous competitors, and we examine a few factors that may help 
to ameliorate these problems.  Organizations may possess superior skills for both exploration and 
exploitation activities yet fail to translate this potential into competitive capabilities.  Ambidexterity often 
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involves high levels of differentiation within organizations and creates challenges for coordination that 
firms may not be able to meet.   
The management of ambidexterity has been examined primarily at the intra-group level (He and 
Wong, 2004; Brady and Davis, 2004; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004).  Research to date has focused 
on problems associated with individual units or groups achieving capabilities in both exploitation and 
exploration.  Coordination problems also have been addressed at the level of intra-group processes and – 
in some cases – coordination of the firm as a whole, but little attention has been paid to coordination 
between differentiated units within firms (Un and Cuervo-Cazuerra, 2004; Matusik, 2002).  The problems 
that arise at this level may be particularly salient for ambidextrous firms; exploration and exploitation 
often are concentrated within different functional areas or business units rather than in different sub-
groups within a single unit. 
In this paper, we focus on coordination problems that arise between units that have become highly 
differentiated from each other as a firm develops ambidextrous capabilities.  We begin by developing a 
simple conceptual model of organizational processes that link the potential for ambidexterity to 
performance.  The development of capabilities for both exploring new areas of product or process 
knowledge and exploiting existing knowledge to make incremental improvements in products and 
typically leads to greater unit-level specialization within firms.  This specialization may create new 
coordination problems that, in turn, compromise the ability of the firm to succeed as an ambidextrous 
competitor. 
In developing this analysis, we draw upon a rich tradition of organization theory rooted in the 
industrial sociology of Burns and Stalker (1961) and the contingency theory of Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967).   Contingency theory offers fundamental insight into the impact of specialized knowledge on 
coordination within firms.  The implications of this work for more recent approaches to ambidexterity 
have gone largely unrecognized – partially due to the emphasis on the intra-group level in current work.  
By bringing these issues back into focus, we expand current approaches to deal with some of the 
organizational challenges currently facing managers in ambidextrous firms.  
Realizing the Potential of the Ambidextrous Firm 
The second part of the paper examines the case of a large Chinese company in the industrial and 
consumer chemical industries.  The company has faced mounting pressure to compete as both a highly 
efficient producer of relatively stable products and a consumer market innovator in a price and quality-
sensitive market.  These dual imperatives have created important challenges for management as they move 
the company toward realizing ambidextrous capabilties. 
We have chosen a company in China for several reasons.  First and foremost, firms such as the 
company we examine face critical pressures to innovate and respond to consumer markets while 
continually fine-tuning products and processes.  Rapid opening of Chinese markets and growing cost 
pressure mandate this response.  Chinese companies therefore also can provide broader insights into 
transitional and emerging economies.  A hallmark of economic transition is the lowering of barriers and 
globalization of competition with attendant pressure on domestic firms.  At the same time, China also has 
emerged as one of the world’s great economic powers, and the activities of Chinese companies are 
increasingly important to global business.   
The paper concludes with a brief examination of some of the mechanisms that can help mitigate 
the organizational problems that arise with ambidexterity.  Underlying social relationships and structural 
arrangements within organizations may both play vital roles in ameliorating these problems.  Managers 
must recognize existing social capital resources within firms and act to create structural solutions to 
supplement social coordination when necessary. 
Ambidexterity 
 The idea of ambidexterity and the pressures to become an ambidextrous competitor are vividly 
illustrated in the recent history of Japanese electronics giant Sony.  Two decades ago, the contrast between 
Sony and Matsushita was legendary.  Sony competed as an innovator, bringing out more sophisticated 
products and reacting quickly to the whims of consumers.  Matsushita was famous for capabilities in 
reproducing and refining products already in the market while fine-tuning production processes to drive 
costs down.  Sony had highly developed capabilities for exploring new areas of product and process 
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knowledge; Matsushita was paramount in exploiting existing knowledge to improve products and 
processes by degree. 
 Two decades later, Sony no longer can afford to be an explorer and leave competition in 
exploitation to others.  They are now faced by competitors such as Samsung who have moved from 
strategies similar to Matsushita to develop strong exploration capabilities while refining proven 
capabilities for exploitation.  Sony now struggles to find ways to sustain its status as an industry innovator 
while simultaneously driving down costs and upgrading quality. 
Just as the need for firms such as Sony to achieve ambidexterity is relatively recent, the 
recognition that firms can compete in this way is a recent idea for management research.  When March 
(1991) wrote his pathbreaking work on “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” these 
two modes of learning were largely viewed as alternatives that competed with each other for 
organizational resources (Miller and Friesen, 1986).  However, the late 1990’s witnessed growing 
recognition that firms in highly competitive environments cannot afford to focus on either exploration or 
exploitation alone (Levinthal and March, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004; Benner and Tushman, 2003).  Rapid 
technological change, globalization, and new sources of information shortened product cycles, raised the 
pace of imitation and substitution, and ramped up pressure for efficiency (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
D’Aveni, 1994).  Survival increasingly meant that firms had to be able to excel in both exploration of new 
areas of knowledge and exploitation of established capabilities (He and Wong, 2004; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1996).   
Research in the last few years has begun to emphasize this duality.  A growing body of work in 
strategic management and marketing has examined the strategies of ambidextrous firms.  Attention also 
has turned to the organizational problems associated with ambidexterity, particularly processes of learning 
and decision-making within groups. 
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Unit-level Specialization and Differentiation within the Firm 
Although much of the work on ambidexterity has focused on processes that take place within 
groups (He and Wong, 2004; Brady and Davis, 2004; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; Özsommer and 
Genctürk, 2003; Schildt et al., 2005), there has begun to be recognition that differentiation among units or 
departments may play a vital role for ambidextrous firms.  Business units may face very different 
environments and require differing degrees of innovation, with the result that specific departments or 
SBU’s emphasize the development of either exploration or exploitation capabilities (Mendelson and Pillai, 
1999).  Structural differentiation within divisions or business units can be even more significant (Dewar 
and Hage, 1978).  Exploitative learning often is associated with groups such as production while 
exploration may be concentrated in R&D or marketing units. 
The idea that specialization and differentiation among internal units is important to a firm’s ability 
to respond to the environment is not new.  In certain ways, the concept can be traced back to Adam Smith 
(1994), and it has been one of the foundations of management research since Lawrence and Lorsch’s 
(1967) pathbreaking work on contingency theory.  The fact that organizations must achieve requisite 
levels of specialization among units – and develop integrating mechanisms to coordinate the activities of 
specialized units – has been one of the most durable findings of organizational research (e.g Dewar and 
Hage, 1978; Gulati et al., 2001; Herbert, 1977).  
Ambidexterity relies on a high degree of inter-unit or inter-group differentiation (Ancona et.al., 
2001; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997 ; He and Wong, 2004).  People engaged in explorative learning 
characteristically operate with a good deal of autonomy and often work under informal structural 
arrangements (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  Exploitation activities, on the other hand, are facilitated by 
more structured, bureaucratic administration and incentives that emphasize efficiency in routine tasks 
(Masini et al., 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).   
These differences in group functions, structures, and incentives have profound implications for 
staffing and group culture (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  Groups more heavily involved in exploration 
typically will be composed of people who are quite different from the staff of exploitation-oriented units.  
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Outcome-focused people who prefer riskier environments with fewer formal controls will be attracted to 
exploration-intensive work, and effective organizations will select and retain employees partly on those 
criteria.  Conversely, exploitation-oriented units are likely to be staffed by people with lower tolerance for 
risk but greater affinity for routines and bureaucratic control.   
Some degree of social differentiation characteristically accompanies structural differentiation 
within firms.  However, the relationship between structural and social differentiation is not deterministic.  
Two groups may perform substantially different functions and have different capabilities, but personnel 
may not vary greatly in their social characteristics or culture.  This is important because coordination is 
more problematic when social characteristics reinforce structural divisions (Robins and Lui, 2005; Lau 
and Murnighan,1998; Chan, 1989; Alderfer and Smith, 1982).  The factors that can moderate divisive 
effects of social and structural differentiation also differ in certain important ways. 
Coordination 
Coordination between differentiated groups or units may be challenging.  The individuals 
involved may have incompatible attitudes toward work and frame key objectives of the business in very 
different ways.  At a purely personal level, empathy between group managers or personnel may be limited.  
This can create deep conflict between groups that must be overcome in order to achieve the coordination 
that is necessary to realize the potential of each group (Ginn and Rubenstein, 1986). 
However, underlying conflict of this type does not necessarily become manifest as a failure of 
coordination.  Groups that are sharply divided on cognitive and affective grounds may nonetheless work 
effectively within coordinating structures that minimize problems of goal incongruence.  One of the 
fundamental insights of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) is that groups within 
organizations need not have identical objectives, views of the environment, or attitudes.  Organizational 
effectiveness requires unit-level objectives that are compatible with the division of labor in the larger 
organization.  At the same time, the structure of the organization must be designed in ways that facilitate 
necessary coordination across disparate units and groups.   
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Firms therefore face a conundrum.  The same capabilities that provide the potential for 
ambidexterity also are linked to high levels of differentiation among business units and functional groups.  
This differentiation leads to inter-group conflict around a range of basic issues, and it can polarize the 
attitudes of the people involved.   Conflict, in turn, may exacerbate coordination problems and thus block 
realization of a firm’s potential for ambidexterity.  In effect, ambidexterity can become its own worst 
enemy; the conditions that create the potential for ambidexterity also drive processes that can stand in the 
way of realizing that potential.  These relationships can be illustrated with a simple conceptual model of 
processes affecting the ability of firms to achieve ambidextrous performance (Figure 1). 
(-)
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Figure 1:
High-level capabilities are required for firms to succeed in exploration or exploitation activities.   
Capabilities of this type reside in teams and systems that can be found within departments or business 
units in firms.  The presence of both units that contain strong exploration capabilities and units that 
contain strong exploitation capabilities therefore is a prerequisite for ambidextrous performance – it 
defines the potential for ambidexterity. 
However, the potential created by the presence of these unit-level capabilities may not be realized 
in the form of performance.  Ambidextrous performance involves simultaneous, coordinated utilization of 
unit level capabilities.  As noted above, the organizational challenges associated with this can be 
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formidable.  Firms’ efforts to excel in introducing new products and processes while refining existing ones 
and driving down costs often founder on basic problems of coordination and management.    
 
Case History: Shanghai Diversified Chemicals 
 These issues can be seen very clearly in the experiences of Shanghai Diversified Chemicals1 
[footnote: This is a disguised name.  Anonymity of the company and its managers was a condition for 
doing the case study]  Shanghai Diversified Chemicals (SDC) is an industrial and consumer chemical 
company that manufactures and markets a range of products from industrial detergents to personal 
products such as cosmetics.  The company was formed approximately fifteen years ago as a joint venture 
between a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a North American multinational. 
 The resulting firm is unusual in a number of ways.  It is a highly integrated company that carries 
out the full range of operations from R&D to marketing in China.  The company is not export-focused; the 
majority of output goes into the domestic market.  The foreign parent firm also is unusual.  It is a closely-
held company with strong traditions of paternalistic management.  This aspect of corporate culture helped 
SDC integrate employees from the former state-owned enterprise.  The Human Resources Director of 
SDC notes that the traditional, paternalistic culture of the foreign parent was compatible with the culture 
of the SOE.  Both companies emphasized stable employment and had a holistic approach  in which the 
company took responsibility for many areas of an employee’s life. 
 One result of this was that certain departments in SDC such as Production were heavily staffed 
with engineers and managers from the former SOE.  However, other areas such as Consumer Marketing 
tended to have few former SOE employees – in part due to the fact that marketing functions traditionally 
had little significance in socialist state-owned enterprises.  The people in marketing typically were 
younger than average for the firm, had clocked fewer years within the firm, were highly sensitive to trends 
and Western tastes, and they often were very individualistic and materialistic.   
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Exploration and Exploitation: Marketing versus Production 
In many ways, both the Consumer Marketing and Production groups were well-suited to their 
roles.  The Consumer Marketing group had substantial responsibility for identifying and developing new 
products in areas such as cosmetics and personal products.  Tastes in these areas changed quickly, and 
they were increasingly affected by worldwide trends in the media.  The Consumer Marketing people were 
in touch with these trends; they often favored personal lifestyles similar to their customers. 
 Although quite different from Consumer Marketing, staff of the Production Department also were 
well-suited to their roles.  They tended to be highly experienced people with strong team skills and a sharp 
eye for detail.  The Production Department had been very successful in fine-tuning production methods 
and slicing costs from some of the stable processes that supported core products.  They also were excellent 
at quality control and quality improvement; the company was one of the earliest in China to achieve ISO 
certification. 
 Factors other than the history of the firm also contributed to differences between departments.  
The daily routine in an area such as production was very stable; managers, engineers, and line employees 
were all largely bound to the schedule of manufacturing.  R&D or Marketing had less structured workdays, 
and marketing managers often were in the field with store buyers and other clients.  Incentives also varied; 
the Marketing Department received substantial performance bonuses based on new revenue.  The fixed 
portion of salaries was much higher for Production; bonuses typically contributed a small portion of salary.  
These differences were logical in terms of group functions and they also fit the culture of the groups. 
 However, production engineers often found themselves at a loss when confronted with new 
product plans developed by Consumer Marketing.  The products often were impossible to produce in any 
economical way.  In some cases, specifications for new products were simply impossible.  The Production 
Department frequently ended up handing plans back to Marketing for further development.    
 This was not received well by Marketing.  The young, westernized, private enterprise-oriented 
Marketing staff typically blamed the employees in Production for the problems.  They viewed the former 
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SOE people as antiquated, unimaginative and semi-competent.  In most cases, Marketing responded to 
Production by sending the plans back to Production with few changes.   
 Production responded in kind.  They tended to view the Marketing people as unskilled, 
undisciplined and unrealistic – and they blamed the flaws in product specifications on the limited 
competence of people involved in product development within the Marketing department.  Personnel in 
the Production department often did not see new products as offering any advantage over the existing line 
and were skeptical about their value.  Plans for new products frequently were sent back to Marketing with 
most of the original objections restated. 
 This process of handing plans for new products back and forth continued through multiple 
iterations and waves of recriminations until a manufacturable product emerged.  The process created a 
major problem for the company – it was slow, and good ideas sometimes got lost.  In areas such as 
consumer products, it was necessary for SDC to be quick to the market with new products.  Trends 
changed rapidly, and a product might be worth little three months after its introduction.  In order to 
succeed in these markets, SDC needed continually explore new product areas, look for breakthrough 
products, and bring them to market quickly. 
 At the same time, even the consumer products area was not immune to cost pressures.  New 
overseas competitors entered the Chinese market daily, and competition was eroding margins.  SDC faced 
mounting pressure to be innovative and responsive to the market while constantly reducing costs and 
boosting quality.  The firm was having difficulty meeting these challenges.   
 On one level, the problem was simple: groups composed of different people with different 
incentives, operating procedures, and attitudes had difficulty coordinating their activities.  On another 
level, the problem was profound.  The company had the unit-level capabilities in production and 
marketing necessary to succeed as an ambidextrous competitor.  However, these two different areas had a 
level of social differentiation from each other that led to serious coordination problems. Members of the 
two groups framed problems differently, had trouble finding a common language, and had little trust in 
each other’s competence.  These coordination problems stood in the way of either group realizing its full 
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potential.  These issues had not been pressing in the world of government-scheduled production by SOE’s, 
or even in the context of post-reform industrial markets, but they caused major problems for a firm in the 
fast-moving consumer markets of contemporary China.  Increased competition and an accelerating pace of 
innovation in the industry had made a formerly stable situation potentially crippling to the firm. 
The fact that different units had skills, staffing, procedures and cultures that were specialized to 
their different roles was not, in itself, a problem  In many ways, specialization is the reason for the 
existence of complex organizations, and it is a necessary condition for survival in the modern world.  
Increasing pressures for innovation, cost efficiency and quality require constant improvement in the 
capabilities of firms and the development of ever-greater levels of specialized knowledge.  This 
specialization also implies growing social differences among units and greater challenges for coordination.   
High levels of inter-group differentiation create a need for mechanisms to ameliorate the impact 
that social and cognitive differences can have on coordination (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  The problem 
faced by SDC was not excessive specialization; it was the fact that the social resources and structural 
arrangements within the firm were not adequate to moderate the effects of inter-unit conflict on 
coordination among departments. 
Moderating Coordination Problems 
Coordination problems of this type can be addressed on two levels: through social relationships 
that reduce conflict between differentiated groups, and through an organizational architecture that 
facilitates coordination of the activities of groups even if they experience conflict.  Internal (intra-firm) 
relational and cognitive social capital can help to bridge gaps between units within the firm and relieve 
inter-unit conflict.  Effective organizational design can help to prevent conflict from becoming a basis for 
failures of coordination. 
A more complete view of the interrelationships among these forces is summarized in Figure 2.  
Potential ambidexterity is defined, in the first instance, by capabilities developed at the level of units or 
groups within the firm.  The ability to realize this potential and translate it into performance relies heavily 
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on social relationships that cross unit lines and integrative mechanisms that may be designed and managed 
from higher levels. 
Figure 2: 
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Social capital and conflict 
Conflict between groups has affective and cognitive dimensions.  In the case of affective conflict, 
personnel in different groups or units may view each other’s competence or motives with distrust, and this 
distrust may become an obstacle to inter-group coordination.  Cognitive forms of conflict can play an even 
greater role in creating failures of coordination.  People who frame problems in different ways and have 
different mental maps of the environment inevitably face major challenges in joint problem solving or 
developing protocols and operating procedures; the shared organizational language required for 
coordinated activity does not exist (Arrow, 1974; March, 1994).  In very simple terms, it is easier to 
coordinate the actions of people who do not like each other than the actions of people who cannot 
communicate with each other. 
Internal Social Capital and Conflict 
Internal social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002) is rooted in an underlying social community that 
facilitates the creation and transfer of knowledge among individuals within organizations (Kogut and 
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Zander, 1992,1996 ; Loasby, 1998; Naphiet and Ghosal, 1998).  Naphiet and Ghoshal (1998) suggest a 
useful distinction between the relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital that parallels the social 
and cognitive dimensions of conflict.  Relational social capital follows Jacobs’s (1965) original usage of 
the term “social capital” – it designates a set of interactions that breed trust, approval and respect among 
individuals.  Cognitive social capital refers to representations and interpretations of reality and systems of 
meaning that are shared among a set of individuals.  The idea of cognitive social capital has a great deal in 
common with Arrow’s (1974) notion of organizational language or Grant’s (1996) discussion of common 
language within organizations, and it is rooted in the classic sociological treatment of shared 
representations developed by Durkheim (1995) and refined by more recent sociologists such as Cicourel 
(1973). 
Relational social capital that cuts across the boundaries of differentiated groups or units within a 
firm may help moderate the divisive effects of social differentiation and thus reduce the affective side of 
conflict.  This can help to create greater trust and motivation for coordination, particularly when 
coordination involves activities such as joint problem solving.  Cognitive social capital helps attack an 
even more critical problem – obstacles to communication between groups.  Intergroup coordination is 
likely to fail if shared systems of interpretation and meaning are weak, regardless of the motivation of 
group members to cooperate. 
Social capital resources typically are built up over time, and it may be difficult for managers to 
find ways to rapidly remedy shortfalls in social capital.  From a managerial standpoint, social capital 
resources are better treated as fixed in the near term.  In cases where social capital resources are 
insufficient to reduce conflict to manageable levels, organizational architecture may offer a means of 
reducing the impact of conflict on coordination.   
Organizational architecture and coordination 
A variety of organization structures and integrating mechanisms have been developed that can aid 
in coordination of the activities of units that are operating with different local goals and different 
information.  Matrix structures, project teams, task forces, and even product or client managers all serve 
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this purpose.  Each of these devices provides a means of tapping the specialized capabilities of different 
groups and coordinating the use of those capabilities to achieve organization-level objectives. 
The role of organizational design in dealing with coordination problems of this type has been 
explored at great length in research on management (e.g. Galbraith, 1973).  It may be particularly 
important in the context of ambidextrous organizations.  In cases where social capital resources are not 
sufficient to minimize the effects of inter-unit conflict, structured responses based on organizational 
design may offer a means of sustaining ambidexterity.  
Organizational responses of this type also may face difficult challenges.  The potential for inter-
unit failures of coordination becomes higher with competition for resources.  Even units with otherwise 
congruent goals may find that they are in competition for the resources necessary to pursue their 
objectives. Under munificent conditions, this type of rivalry may be muted; however, scarcity can be 
expected to bring it to the forefront.  Sustaining necessary levels of coordination in the face of resource 
scarcity probably is one of the greatest challenges faced by ambidextrous firms. 
As competitive pressures continue to accelerate, the challenges of managing ambidexterity are 
taking on even greater urgency for firms.  In the process, long-standing ideas about environmental 
contingency and the link between organizational structure and performance also have assumed new 
importance.  When these established concepts are brought together with ideas from recent work on social 
capital and innovation, they can provide valuable insights into ways that firms can respond to rapidly 
changing competitive conditions. 
This paper is little more than a preliminary sketch of some key ideas and issues.  The growing role 
of firm-level ambidexterity in the contemporary business environment strongly argues for further 
development and integration of these ideas.  This approach has the potential to provide both an expanded 
research agenda on the ambidextrous firm and important practical insights into a vital problem facing 
managers – understanding how organizational design can help their firms leverage diverse capabilities to 
achieve superior performance. 
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